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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1318 
___________ 
 
CESAR XAVIER BARROS-SUAREZ, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A041-664-426) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Andrew Arthur 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 2, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Cesar Xavier Barros-Suarez seeks review of a final order of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”).  We will deny the petition for review. 
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Barros-Suarez is a citizen of Ecuador.  In 1998, he was admitted into the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident.  In 2000, a Pennsylvania jury found him guilty of 
third-degree murder, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2502(c), and carrying a firearm without a 
license, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6106(a).  He was sentenced to a prison term of between 
20 and 40 years on the murder conviction, and a consecutive prison term of between one 
and five years on the firearm conviction.  Barros-Suarez’s direct appeals failed, as have 
his subsequent attempts to obtain collateral relief in both state and federal court. 
Following his convictions, the Government initiated removal proceedings against 
Barros-Suarez.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found him removable on two independent 
grounds:  (1) under INA § 237(a)(2)(C), based on his conviction for carrying a firearm 
without a license; and (2) under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), based on his conviction for 
third-degree murder, which the IJ concluded constituted the aggravated felony of 
“murder” within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A).  On appeal, Barros-Suarez only 
disputed the IJ’s conclusion that his third-degree murder conviction constituted a 
“murder” conviction within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A).  He contended that 
removability based on § 101(a)(43)(A) requires a conviction for an intentional murder.1
The BIA dismissed the appeal, explaining that it was unnecessary to reach the 
merits of Barros-Suarez’s argument because he did not challenge the IJ’s separate finding 
   
                                              
1 He also argued that he was not removable on the basis of having been convicted of a 
“crime of violence” under INA § 101(a)(43)(F).  The BIA did not address that argument 
because although the Government had filed Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/ 
Deportability (Form I-261) charging Barros-Suarez as removable based on the “crime of 
violence” provision in INA § 101(a)(43)(F), the IJ’s decision did not address that charge. 
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that he was also removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(C), based on his firearm conviction, 
and did “not assert that he is eligible for any form of relief.”  The BIA noted that if it 
were to reach Barros-Suarez’s argument, however, it would affirm the IJ’s conclusion 
that he was also removable under INA §§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 101(a)(43)(A). 
Barros-Suarez filed a pro se petition for review in this Court, renewing his 
argument that his third-degree murder conviction is not a conviction for “murder” within 
the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(A) because it lacks an intent element, and therefore the 
IJ erred by finding him removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).  His brief further 
argues that he is not removable under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), because he was not convicted 
of a “crime of violence,” and also advances arguments collaterally attacking his 
convictions.  Once again, he does not dispute removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 
based on his conviction for carrying a firearm without a license.  He also filed a motion 
for a stay of removal accompanying his petition, which we denied on March 26, 2013.  
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  
Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing “constitutional claims and questions of law.”  See 
INA § 242(a)(2)(D); Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, 
the question of law presented by Barros-Suarez’s petition is that his state conviction for 
third-degree murder is not a basis for removal under INA §§ 101(a)(43)(A) and 
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) because that crime lacks the necessary element of intent for “murder.” 2
                                              
2 The Government has filed a motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground that Barros-Suarez failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to 
challenging his removability under INA § 237(a)(2)(C), and therefore this Court lacks 
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We agree with the BIA that Barros-Suarez cannot obtain any relief based on this 
claim because even if we agreed with his argument,3
Accordingly, the petition for review will be denied.
 he has never challenged his 
removability on the separate basis of INA § 237(a)(2)(C).  We decline to consider 
Barros-Suarez’s argument relating to his removability under INA § 101(a)(43)(F), 
because that ground was not addressed by the BIA.  See Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 
231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003).  We also do not consider Barros-Suarez’s arguments which 
appear to collaterally attack his convictions because they are irrelevant for purposes of 
these proceedings.  See Paredes v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 196, 198-99 (3d Cir. 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                  
jurisdiction to consider any ground upon which he may be afforded relief.  We will deny 
this motion because the petition for review presents a question of law with respect to the 
IJ’s determination that Barros-Suarez is also removable under 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The 
record reflects that Barros-Suarez has properly exhausted a challenge to that finding. 
3 In his reply brief, Barros-Suarez argues that we should decide whether his Pennsylvania 
conviction for third-degree murder is an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 
because his eligibility for cancellation of removal depends upon resolution of the issue.  
We decline to decide the issue, as he did not apply for cancellation of removal before the 
IJ.  See INA § 240A(a)(3).  We note, however, that a recent BIA decision holds that the 
term “murder” in § 101(a)(43)(A) includes more than intentional murder.  See In re M-
W-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 748, 759 (BIA 2012). 
